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tially, Eastern firms made much larger forecast errors 
than those in the West. (Note that there is no unusual 
spike in Western forecast errors, due to the shock of 
reunification or any other reason, and that we do not 
explain movements in the forecast error per se but 
only differences between East and West.) Over time, 
forecast errors in the East decreased and converged 
to Western levels. We see that real-world convergence 
took a decade, despite the fact that formal institutions 
converged immediately, and business conditions con-
verged very quickly.
The improvement of Eastern firms’ forecasts as 
evidenced in Figure 2 suggests a learning process and 
we show that, across firms, the rate of learning depends 
on market uncertainty. We do not explain the technical 
details of the learning process over uncertainty here, 
but one can use the following analogy. Suppose one 
has to predict the weather after relocating from a valley 
to the mountains. Weather in the mountains is gener-
ally more volatile than in valleys and hence harder to 
predict without specific information. Weather informa-
tion, or signals, in remote areas may be less frequent 
or from more distant meteorological stations than in 
urban settings, also complicating predictions. Finally, 
though, the longer one lives in the new location, the 
better one understands the weather patterns and 
aggregate information from various sources. Compar-
ing industries, we find evidence that firms learn to fore-
cast business conditions in a new environment consist-
ent with this analogy. 
Our study is not without limitations. Although 
we measure the learning of Eastern firms that lived 
through reunification, the reasons why firms learn 
remain somewhat obscure. In particular, given that our 
natural experiment shocked not just Eastern firms, but 
the individuals and non-firm institutions, we cannot 
ultimately disentangle organizational learning from 
individual learning. Although we have ruled out sur-
vival of the fittest at the firm level as a primary driver 
of the observed improvements, we cannot rule out 
that better forecasting managers (many Eastern firms 
replaced top management with Westerners) displace 
worse ones within firms. Our results stress that firms 
need to learn to operate in new settings. The lessons 
of this switch to capitalism, though more drastic than 
most changes to business environments, may help set 
realistic expectations for how quickly firms adjust to 
sweeping market changes like new trade rules, e.g., 
the departure of Britain from the EU. New formal insti-
tutions might be built quickly, but firms need longer to 
learn how to operate in the new environment.
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Economic decisions involving firm production or invest-
ment hinge, implicitly or explicitly, on the assumption 
that firms can predict future business conditions, e.g., 
they know or can predict factor prices, production 
technology, demand, and competitor behavior in the 
next period – for firm decisions today depend critically 
on (estimates of) these variables tomorrow. But neither 
managers nor firms are likely to be born with the abil-
ity to accurately forecast future business conditions. 
Our research asks, do they learn to forecast? How long 
does this learning take? How do market dynamics, and 
especially various types of uncertainty, affect forecast 
quality and learning? 
At first blush, one might naively assume that simply 
measuring a positive correlation between firm age and 
forecast quality would suffice to establish that firms 
learn to forecast over time. And indeed, we show that as 
firms age, they forecast future business conditions 
better. Nevertheless, firm age correlates with many 
confounding and often unobservable factors besides 
experience that could affect forecast quality – young 
firms are smaller, their employees tend to be younger, 
their markets tend to be newer, and so on. To estab-
lish a causal link between experience and learning, an 
ideal experiment would randomly place a cross-section 
of firms into a new market environment alongside oth-
erwise similar counterparts that are very experienced in 
the market and compare the evolution of their fore-
casts of subsequently shared market conditions. Ger-
man reunification was such an event.2 
Our analysis builds on the firm-level data of the 
widely cited ifo Business Climate Survey (Geschäfts-
klimaindex), which provides business condition fore-
casts and realizations for German firms. Every month 
since 1949, the survey has collected the near-term 
expectations and assessment of business conditions 
for numerous German manufacturing firms. This data 
allows us to construct firm-level forecast errors – the 
difference between expectations and realizations – 
and to analyze firms’ learning of business condition 
forecasting under the quasi-experiment of German 
reunification. Relatively homogeneous Germany was 
abruptly divided in 1949, and for four decades firms in 
1 T his short piece summarizes a working paper with the same title. The paper, 
which also contains all references, can be accessed at: https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229702. 
2  Germany was reunited on October 3, 1990. An economic and monetary union was 
already established on July 1st of that y e a r.
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East Germany operated under a master-planned, com-
munist economy. For these firms of all sizes, maturities, 
and across the spectrum of industries, market states 
were dictated, not predicted. Then suddenly, and quite 
unexpectedly, with German reunification in 1990, these 
firms were thrust into the free market economy of the 
West. Uniquely among transition countries, East Ger-
many immediately received developed country institu-
tions (e.g., legal system, property rights, social welfare) 
as well as full global market access. Nevertheless, East-
ern managers recognized a deficiency in their under-
standing of market economies. In 1991, West German 
firms hosted East German managers as interns. About 
70 percent of these interns self-reported having a poor 
knowledge of market economics; more than 85 percent 
of their Western hosts shared that assessment.
However, there is a worry that reunification left 
Eastern firms not only with different understandings 
of the market, but altogether different market condi-
tions than Western ones. Here we provide evidence that 
changes in market states did not differ fundamentally 
between East and West. Differences in forecast errors 
stem from differences in expectations, not realizations. 
First, previous research suggests that after reunifica-
tion, Eastern firms did not sell into different markets, 
but rather Eastern firms swiftly reoriented their exports 
from planned to market economies. After 1990 most 
transition countries underwent severe recessions and 
demand for East German firms’ products collapsed. 
Furthermore, these countries suddenly had to pay for 
their imports from former East Germany in deutsch-
marks, which they could not afford. Whereas in 1991 
sales to former West Germany roughly doubled, sales 
to Eastern Europe and the former USSR roughly halved. 
In any case, Eastern firms mostly sold domestically. 
Around reunification just under 60 percent of Eastern 
firms’ sales were domestic. Eastern firms in 1987 made 
only 7 percent of their revenue from exports to Eastern 
Europe. By 1992 the number had fallen to 1.6 percent. 
Second, our data also indicates that the market states 
did not differ substantially between the two regions. 
Figure 1 plots the time series for the correlation coef-
ficients between Eastern and Western aggregate reali-
zations and expectations respectively. The correlation 
between Eastern and Western aggregate realizations 
rises rapidly above 0.8 almost immediately after reuni-
fication and increases only slightly thereafter. Corre-
lations between aggregate expectations reach similar 
strength only after 1997. This suggests that markets 
between regions homogenized quickly, and the conver-
gence in forecast errors does not come from alignment 
of actual market conditions but rather expectations, 
which took longer to converge.
How long did it take Eastern firms to forecast mar-
ket conditions as well as their Western peers? Figure 2 
plots forecast error magnitudes (no direction) by West-
ern firms since 1980 and Eastern ones after reunification 
and provides evidence for the impact of reunification 
on Eastern firms and their subsequent learning. Ini- Source: Authors’ calculations. © ifo Institute
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